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Abstract: The influence of U.S. Supreme Court majority opinions depends
critically on how these opinions are received and treated by lower courts, which
decide the vast majority of legal disputes. We argue that the retirement of Justices
on the Supreme Court serves as a simple heuristic device for lower court judges
in deciding how much deference to show to Supreme Court precedent. Using a
unique dataset of the treatment of all Supreme Court majority opinions in the
courts of appeals from 1953 to 2012, we find that negative treatments of Supreme
Court opinions increase, and positive treatments decrease, as the Justices who
supported a decision retire from the Court. Importantly, this effect exists over and
above the impact of retirements on the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
Opinions by the U.S. Supreme Court fundamentally shape the legal landscape and thus
have a significant effect on social, economic, and political outcomes. As scholars have long
recognized, much of this impact is realized indirectly through the manner in which high court
decisions (which are relatively few in number) guide and constrain the decisions of other courts
in the judicial hierarchy (e.g., Cameron Segal, and Songer 2000). Put differently, the influence
and importance of any given Supreme Court decision is largely a function of its treatment in
lower courts. Do lower court judges faithfully follow the opinion, ignore it, or perhaps cast doubt
on it? Given that the manner in which Supreme Court decisions fare in the lower courts is so
central, it is not surprising that scholars have taken great interest in understanding what drives
lower court treatments of Supreme Court precedents. A rich literature, much of it developed over
the last fifteen years, has illuminated this question. Thus, we now have a good understanding of
how the characteristics of Supreme Court opinions – including the number of concurrences, as
well as the size and breadth of the majority coalition – shape subsequent lower court treatment
(Benesh and Reddick 2002; Benjamin and Desmarais 2012; Black and Spriggs 2008; Corley
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2009). Similarly, scholars have made significant progress in uncovering how dynamic changes in
the legal environment, including the age of Supreme Court opinions, and ideological shifts
between the enacting and subsequent Supreme Courts, affect how lower courts treat precedents
(e.g., Westerland et al. 2010, Hansford and Spriggs 2006).
In this paper, we focus on a factor that has escaped systematic analysis: The impact of
personnel change on the Supreme Court over and above the impact of such change on the
ideological composition of the Court. Specifically, we argue that – separate from the impact of
judicial turnover on the general ideological position of the Court – the retirement of Supreme
Court Justices who joined a majority opinion significantly impacts the staying power of the
decisions they supported: As departures reduce the number of Justices on the Court who
explicitly signed on to an opinion, lower court judges become significantly less likely to follow
the opinion, and more likely to openly cast doubt on it. We argue that this effect results from the
fact that judges on lower courts confront a complex task in applying a large number of
potentially relevant precedents to the cases before them. As they do so, one key concern is to
avoid censure by the current Supreme Court. In navigating this problem, lower court judges have
strong incentives to look for simple heuristics that can help them to identify decisions that are
more likely to have the support of the current Court (and should therefore be treated positively)
and those less likely to enjoy such support (and can therefore be narrowly interpreted or ignored
with less peril). While there are numerous such markers (many of which we control for in the
empirical analysis below), the retirement of Justices who joined a decision constitutes a
particularly prominent one that is easy to spot. A dwindling number of Justices who explicitly
signed on to an opinion readily suggests that the opinion may enjoy less support on the current
Court.
In focusing on this effect of judicial retirements, we highlight an aspect of change in the
Court’s membership that has received scant attention. Most analyses of turnover on the Court are
concerned with the way in which such changes shift the Court’s ideology (e.g., Ruckman 1993,
Shipan and Shannon 2003), and what the impact on future Supreme Court decisions is likely to
be (e.g. Baum 1992, Segal 1985).1 Our findings suggest that the effects of turnover on the
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Supreme Court go well beyond how the Court decides future cases. Retirements also shape the
manner in which appeals courts implement existing precedents. Because these courts resolve the
vast bulk of cases, this implies that the impact of judicial turnover on our legal system is
potentially far greater than has traditionally been recognized. Justices may think of themselves as
creating precedents that will long outlive them, but their opinions may instead diminish in
importance as the Justices who supported them leave the Court.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Part II explains why departures of
Supreme Court Justices are likely to affect how appeals courts treat past Supreme Court
decisions. Part III turns to a unique dataset that traces the treatment of all Supreme Court
majority opinions by courts of appeals on a yearly basis from 1953 to 2012. These data allow us
to investigate whether appeals court judges respond systematically to the retirement of Supreme
Court Justices in their treatment of Supreme Court opinions. In Part IV we find strong evidence
that, controlling for a wide variety of factors known to affect the treatment of Supreme Court
precedent (including the general ideological shift of the Supreme Court), the retirement of
Justices who supported an opinion significantly shapes the manner in which these opinions are
treated subsequently: Opinions experience a significant decrease in influence as fewer and fewer
of the Justices who originally joined an opinion remain on the contemporary Supreme Court. In
Part V we conclude by discussing the ramifications of our findings for our understanding of
Supreme Court precedents and the Supreme Court as a continuing body.

II. SUPREME COURT RETIREMENTS AND THE TREATMENT OF OPINIONS
In the American legal system, lower courts play a critical role – indeed, the vast majority
of legal disputes are resolved in the lower courts, and never reach the Supreme Court. Lower
federal courts handle hundreds of thousands of cases each year, fewer than 100 of which are
reviewed by the Supreme Court (Administrative Office of the United States Courts 2013). Of
course, these lower courts are embedded in the judicial hierarchy, and are supposed to adjudicate
disputes as directed by the relevant precedents, particularly those issued by the Supreme Court.
To ensure that they do so, and in order to resolve potential conflicts among lower courts, lower
court decisions are subject to review and potential reversal by the Supreme Court.

not affect the Court’s median (Carrubba et al. 2012).
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Given the prominent role of precedent in this institutional arrangement, a key challenge
for lower court judges is to survey the existing stock of precedent to assess how the case before
them fits into this stock – that is, to determine how the case should be decided in light of the
applicable precedents. Significantly, this is a complex, challenging task. Typically, there are
many potentially relevant precedents. And often, there are tensions, if not conflicts, between
them. In writing an opinion, a lower court judge must therefore decide how to navigate this
thicket – which opinions to acknowledge as directly relevant, which to present as inapplicable,
and which to ignore. Naturally, a number of factors are likely to be influential in this process,
including the jurisprudential and ideological inclinations of the judges.
As a matter of legal doctrine, one factor that lower court judges are not supposed to
consider are their perceptions of the current Supreme Court’s views of a precedent. This implies
that changes in membership should have no bearing on the precedential value of a majority
opinion. Indeed, a central element of precedent for continuing bodies like the Supreme Court is
that a past decision remains authoritative even if the specific Justices who created the precedent
leave the Court. The Supreme Court has stated forcefully that lower courts should not reject
applicable Supreme Court decisions based on their assessment of a potential change in the
Supreme Court’s direction. For example, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Hohn v. United
States (524 U.S. 236) minces no words: “Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see fit
to reconsider them” (253).2
Notwithstanding such pronouncements, however, lower court judges who prefer to avoid
review and reversal of their decisions (Epstein and Knight 2013, Posner 1993) must consider
how the current Supreme Court (which, after all, is the body that may review the judge’s
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opinion) views the potentially applicable precedents. That is, lower court judges seeking to make
their decisions less vulnerable on appeal face strong incentives to pay attention to the preferences
of the contemporary Supreme Court as they decide which precedents to rely on to justify their
decisions (Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000, Kastellec 2007, Miceli and Cosgel 1994). If judges
perceive that support on the Supreme Court for a particular decision may have weakened, two
potential effects follow. First, circuit judges who disagree with an opinion may feel less
constrained in expressing their disagreement or, less aggressively, in finding ways to avoid
following the precedent without explicitly criticizing it. Second, even appeals court judges who
have no qualms about a precedent may anticipate how the contemporary Court views the
precedent. If they believe that the current Court is likely to be critical of a given precedent,
appeals court judges may conclude that the safer course (in terms of avoiding their own reversal)
is not to explicitly follow that precedent. Put differently, the anticipation that the Supreme Court
may look upon the precedent with less sympathy may encourage circuit judges to engage in an
explicit critique or, more modestly, to refrain from following the precedent fully (Dorf 1995,
Gruhl 1981, Klein 2002).3
A number of factors are likely to lead appeals court judges to suspect that support for a
decision on the contemporary Supreme Court has weakened, and to adjust their own treatment of
an opinion in response. Most obviously, circuit judges may react to explicit negative treatments
of an opinion by the Supreme Court itself (Hansford and Spriggs 2006). Similarly, ideological
change between the Supreme Court majority that issued a precedent and the current Supreme
Court suggests that the current Court may take a more critical view of a precedent. It is precisely
for this reason that scholars have argued that ideological shifts between the enacting and
contemporary Supreme Court will lead lower courts to treat opinions less favorably, and a
number of studies provide strong evidence for such an effect (e.g., Gruhl 1981, Hansford and
Spriggs 2006, Klein 2002, Westerland et al. 2010). Given that the retirement of Supreme Court
Justices and their replacement with new Justices affects the ideological composition of the Court,
retirements are therefore (indirectly) relevant for how lower courts treat precedents.
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The central argument of this paper is that such retirement-induced ideological change is
not the only manner in which retirements matter for how lower courts treat precedent. We argue
that in addition to this indirect effect, retirements also have a direct negative effect on how lower
courts treat opinions: Lower court judges do not merely focus on ideological change (What is the
balance of conservative and liberal Justices?). They also take note of the fact that the particular
Justices who joined a decision retire. There are two (related) reasons why we expect judicial
retirements have this effect. First, judicial retirements are correlated with, but separate from,
general ideological shifts on the Court. For one, ideological shifts can occur even in the absence
of change in Court membership as the views of Justices evolve (this is, obviously, a major
impetus behind dynamic measures of Supreme Court ideology, such as the Martin-Quinn (2002)
scores). More importantly, ideological shifts that are measured along a traditional liberalconservative dimension do not capture differences in views that are orthogonal to ideology, and
can exist even among Justices of a similar ideological persuasion. How Justices view cases is a
complex phenomenon, affected by ideology, interpretive commitments, life experiences, and
other (perhaps idiosyncratic) factors (Posner 2008). The manner in which Justices view opinions
is bound up – at least to some extent – in factors that are tied to their specific experiences and
temperament. One particularly important factor in this context is that Justices may feel more
personally attached to opinions they joined than to opinions they did not join. As a result, a new
set of Justices may take a different view of cases previously decided, even if they share the
general ideological predispositions of their predecessors.
This reasoning is reinforced by the fact that in addition to plausibly affecting current
support for a precedent, turnover on the Supreme Court is easy to spot – an important factor
given the complexity of the task confronting lower court judges. The retirement of Justices who
were part of an opinion’s majority acts as a simple heuristic for lower court judges looking for
evidence that support on the Supreme Court for a particular precedent may have weakened.
Moreover, this signal becomes stronger as fewer and fewer of the Justices who joined an opinion
remain on the Court. Consider a lower court judge confronting a precedent for which all the
Justices from the original majority coalition remain on the Court. In this setting, it is natural for a
lower court judge to believe that faithful adherence to the precedent may help to insulate her
decision against review, and that failure to do so risks antagonizing a majority of the Supreme
Court. In contrast, as more and more of the Justices in the original majority leave the Court and
are replaced by new Justices, the situation changes. An increasing number of the Justices on the
6

current Supreme Court have not explicitly signed on to the precedent, and the new Justices may
see the precedent differently.4 All else equal, the lower court judge may feel under less pressure
to explicitly follow the opinion, and may even feel safe in casting doubt on or limiting it. This
argument leads to the following expectation:
Hypothesis (“Retirement Effect on Lower Court Treatments”): Ceteris
paribus, lower court judges are less likely to follow a Supreme Court precedent as
more of the Justices who signed on to the opinion retire from the Court. Similarly,
lower court judges are more likely to treat an opinion negatively as more of the
Justices who signed on to the opinion retire from the Court.

III. DATA AND MEASURES
To test this hypothesis, we require data on how lower courts interact with relevant
Supreme Court precedents. Since judges on the courts of appeals occupy the level below the
Supreme Court, and are directly open to review and reversal by the Supreme Court, we focus our
analysis on them.5 To measure the subsequent treatment of Supreme Court majority opinions in
the courts of appeals, we rely on Shepard’s Citations, an approach that has become standard in
the literature (e.g., see Benjamin and Desmarais 2012, Corley 2009, Hansford and Spriggs 2006,
Westerland et al. 2010). Shepard’s is a widely used, commercial legal research company that
employs attorneys who examine every published state and federal court opinion, and engage in a
content analysis of every citation in those opinions. Citations that have a substantive treatment of
an opinion (i.e., discuss it rather than just mentioning it) are classified into the following main
categories: Overruled, Criticized, Questioned, Limited, Distinguished, Explained, Harmonized,
or Followed. Shepard’s characterizes Overruled, Criticized, Questioned, Limited, and
Distinguished as negative treatments. Of these, the first four are viewed as “strongly negative,”
4

Put simply, the clearest indication of a Justice’s support for a given majority opinion is her joining of it. A Justice
who arrives after the opinion is decided cannot give that indication. Note in this regard that in only four cases in
its history has the Supreme Court overruled one of its cases without a change in membership (Gerhardt 2005:
952).

5

Of course, there are also district courts below the courts of appeals. But district court judges’ opinions are appealed
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Court is a more distant concern. We therefore focus on circuit judges, for whom the only reviewer is the
Supreme Court.
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while Distinguished is classified as a mildly negative treatment. Followed – the most common
treatment – is characterized as a positive treatment.6 Finally, Explained and Harmonized are
neutral. Spriggs and Hansford (2000) investigate the reliability of Shepard’s by independently
coding a stratified sample of Supreme Court cases, and find high levels of agreement between
their coding and Shepard’s.
Because our argument leads to the expectation that circuit court judges will become less
likely to follow a precedent, and more likely to cast doubt on it, as more Justices who joined a
majority opinion retire from the Supreme Court, we focus on strongly negative treatments and on
Followed. The key dependent variable for our analysis is the count of the number of strongly
negative and Followed treatments of a given Supreme Court opinion in a particular year. To
construct our data, we begin with all orally argued cases in which the Supreme Court issued a
signed majority opinion in the 1953-2012 terms, as reported by the U.S. Supreme Court
Database (Spaeth et al. 2013).7 We then use Shepard’s to generate an annual count of the number
of strongly negative treatments and Followed treatments for each of these Supreme Court
opinions in courts of appeals opinions issued between 1953 and the end of 2012.8 In other words,
the unit of observation in the dataset is the “opinion-year,” organized by Supreme Court opinion
(beginning with the year in which the opinion was issued), a structure that makes sense given our
interest in how opinions are treated over time. Finally, we combine these data with information
on the retirement dates of the Justices who constituted the majority in each case, allowing us to
construct the measures discussed in more detail below. The full dataset comprises 5,813 majority
opinions and 188,424 opinion-years.
As we noted above, a strongly negative treatment of a Supreme Court opinion is a risky
move for a circuit judge. Instead of simply citing or ignoring an earlier case, the lower court
criticizes, questions, or limits a Supreme Court opinion and thereby casts doubt on it. In so
doing, the circuit court draws attention to itself and risks rebuke. Not surprisingly, such
treatments are generally rare. As the aggregate data displayed in Table 1 make clear, roughly
6
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Only the Supreme Court can overrule its own cases, so lower courts’ negative reactions cannot include an
overruling. Our data encompass the available strongly negative treatments of a Supreme Court opinion by a
lower court – Criticized, Questioned, and Limited.
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83% of opinions are never criticized, questioned, or limited in this explicit fashion, and only 2%
of opinions receive 4 or more strongly negative treatments. By contrast, following a precedent
that is on point is the expected and obvious way for circuit courts to engage with Supreme Court
opinions. As this reasoning suggests, Followed is a far more common substantive treatment.
Note, however, that even for Followed, more than 50% of opinions receive seven or fewer such
treatments. In order to evaluate changes in treatments over time, we must further break down the
data into yearly treatments of Supreme Court opinions. As Table 2 shows, once we do so,
opinions are not strongly criticized in the vast number of years. Followed treatments are more
common, but even there, most opinions are not positively treated on an annual basis.9

Table 1 about here
Table 2 about here
A. Explanatory Variables
Our argument implies that circuit court judges use the retirement of Supreme Court
Justices as a simple heuristic suggesting that support for a decision may have weakened. As a
result, as more Justices from the original majority coalition retire, the willingness of circuit
judges to faithfully follow the precedent decreases, and their willingness to openly criticize it
increases. Importantly, we expect this effect while controlling for more general ideological
change on the Supreme Court, both because general ideological change is unlikely to capture
idiosyncratic differences among Justices and because the retirement of Justices who signed on to
an opinion is easier for circuit judges to spot than ideological change. To capture this retirement
effect, we employ a variable that indicates the number of Justices from the original majority
coalition that remain on the current Supreme Court during a particular year. For example, for a
7-2 decision, this variable takes the value 7 as long as all Justices from the majority coalition
remain on the Court, drops to 6 as the first Justice retires, and so on. The expectation expressed
in our hypothesis is that as the number of Justices who signed on to an opinion and who remain
on the Supreme Court declines, opinions will be treated in a strongly negative fashion more
often, and will be followed less often.
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The fact that a considerable number of opinion-years feature no strongly negative or Followed treatments raises
potential methodological challenges that we address below.
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As outlined above, we believe that this retirement effect is separate from the impact of
general ideological change on the Supreme Court, which is (of course) itself partly a function of
judicial retirements. Put differently, we want to clearly distinguish the impact of judicial
retirements from the impact of general ideological change. To do so, we control for the absolute
shift in the location of the median Justice on the Supreme Court that issued the cited opinion and
the current Supreme Court, as measured by the Martin-Quinn (2002) scores, the most widelyused, dynamic estimate of the Justices’ preferences. We expect that as this distance increases,
circuit courts will more often treat a Supreme Court opinion in a strongly negative manner.
Conversely, we expect that the number of Followed treatments will decrease. Indeed, previous
work has found evidence consistent with this expectation. Benjamin and Desmarais (2012) show
that the aggregate number of negative treatments increases with the average distance between
Supreme Court medians, and Spriggs and Hansford (2001) have demonstrated that the Supreme
Court is more likely to overrule a precedent the greater the ideological distance between the
decision-median and the contemporary median (see also Hansford and Spriggs 2006). Similarly,
Westerland et al. (2010) show that increasing distance between the median member of the
opinion coalition and the contemporary Supreme Court median significantly reduces compliance
with precedents by circuit court panels.

B. Additional Control Variables
Of course, there are a number of other factors that are likely to affect the treatment of
Supreme Court opinions by appeals courts, and we need to control for these in our analysis. We
can usefully group these into characteristics of the cited Supreme Court opinion that may directly
affect how a decision is received, and dynamic factors that capture changes in the legal
environment (relative to the environment in which the original decision was issued) that may
affect how a decision is treated.
As previous work has shown, the most important characteristics of Supreme Court
opinions that affect their subsequent treatment are the number of Justices who signed on to the
opinion, the ideological range of the majority coalition, and the number of concurrences
published alongside the opinion (Benjamin and Desmarais 2012, Westerland et al. 2010). The
intuition for why these characteristics matter is immediate: One would expect that appeals courts
are less likely to treat negatively and more likely to treat positively opinions that announce legal
rules that are broadly acceptable and sensible to judges and lawyers across the ideological and
10

jurisprudential spectrum. The three characteristics indicate opinions for which this is likely to be
the case: The greater the number of Justices who sign on to an opinion, and the broader the
ideological range of that coalition (which we measure by the range of the majority in terms of
Martin-Quinn scores), the more broadly acceptable the decision is likely to be. We thus expect
these variables to reduce the number of strongly negative treatments, and to increase the number
of Followed treatments during a given year. In contrast, a greater number of concurring opinions
signals that there are alternative legal justifications for the outcome reached in a case, which
signals that the opinion is less broadly acceptable. We thus expect the number of concurrences to
increase the number of strongly negative treatments and to decrease the number of Followed
treatments. Prior work provides evidence consistent with these expectations. For example,
Benjamin and Desmarais (2012) show that aggregate strongly negative treatments of opinions
increase with the number of published concurrences, and decrease for larger majority coalitions,
and for broader coalitions. Similarly, Spriggs and Hansford (2001) find that the probability that
an opinion will be overruled rises in the number of concurrences.10
In addition to controlling for the ideological shift of the Supreme Court, we control for
several factors that may affect the number of strongly negative or Followed treatments. One
factor concerns the preferences of the courts of appeals relative to the Supreme Court that issued
an opinion: One would expect that insofar as lower court judges are ideologically more distant
from the Supreme Court that issued an opinion, they would be more inclined to negatively treat,
and less inclined to follow, a precedent. Controlling for circuit court preferences poses a
challenge: Our data represent a count of treatments of Supreme Court opinions across the courts
of appeals in a given year. Therefore, we focus on the aggregate preferences of the courts of
appeals relative to the Supreme Court. Specifically, for each Supreme Court opinion-year, we
include the absolute difference between the number of Democratic appointees on the Supreme
Court that issued an opinion and the number of Democratic appointees of the courts of appeals in
that year, a standard approach (see McGuire et al. 2009). We expect that as this difference
increases, the number of strongly negative treatments will increase, and the number of Followed
treatments will decline.
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Strongly negative treatments are more likely, and Followed treatments less likely, after
the Supreme Court itself has treated an opinion negatively, thus sending a signal to appeals
courts that an opinion is open to criticism (Westerland et al. 2010). This effect should get
stronger the more often the Supreme Court has treated an opinion negatively. We thus include a
count of the number of times an opinion has been treated negatively by the Supreme Court.
Similarly, if an opinion is explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court, we would of course expect
appeals courts to treat this opinion more negatively and less positively (Benesh and Reddick
2002). We control for this possibility by including a binary variable that indicates opinion-years
after an opinion has been overruled. Because opinions may become less relevant over time, we
include the age of the opinion. Finally, we must take account of the fact that opinions do not have
equal opportunities to be treated negatively or positively. Opinions vary in the extent to which
they are pertinent to the issues currently before the courts of appeals. Some decisions are relevant
in many cases, and thus are cited frequently. Others are more obscure and cited infrequently.
Naturally, an opinion that is relevant in many cases, and is cited often, has a higher likelihood of
being treated negatively or positively than an opinion that is hardly ever relevant, and therefore
has few opportunities to be treated negatively or positively. To capture this, we include the
(logged) count of the number of times an opinion is Followed in a given year in the federal
district courts.11

IV. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
Because our dependent variable is a count of the number of times a given Supreme Court
opinion is treated in a strongly negative or positive fashion by the courts of appeals in a given
year, we employ count models to test our hypothesis. Typically, the primary quantity of interest
in a count model is the incidence rate over an observation period. This incidence rate has a
systematic component, usually modeled as an exponential function of a set of covariates, as well
as a stochastic component. The stochastic component is often assumed to follow a Poisson
distribution, which implies that events (in our case, treatments of Supreme Court opinions) are
conditionally independent. This is a strong assumption that is likely violated in our data: Once an
opinion has been criticized by a lower court, for example, it may be easier for the same court (or
11
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another court of appeals) to do so again. The result of such positive contagion is overdispersion
in the data, which results in a downward bias in standard errors (King 1989). To deal with this
problem, researchers typically assume that the stochastic component of the incidence rate
follows a negative binomial distribution, a solution we adopt as well.12
In so doing, we must confront two additional challenges. One relates directly to the issue
of overdispersion. Our data has a panel structure: We observe the treatment of separate Supreme
Court opinions over time, and it is likely that overdispersion does not affect each opinion in the
same way. This is a common challenge in panel datasets. The standard way to address such unit
heterogeneity is to estimate a random-effects negative binomial model that allows the dispersion
parameter to vary randomly across units (Hilbe 2011). In our specific case, this means that the
dispersion parameter is assumed to be constant for each opinion, but can vary randomly across
opinions.13
The second challenge concerns the large number of observations (opinion-years) for
which no treatment is recorded, especially in our analysis of strongly negative treatments. The
presence of a large number of zeros in the dependent variable suggests that separate processes
may drive whether an opinion is ever treated, and how often it is treated once it attracts the
attention of the lower courts. Statistically, in such situations, the use of zero-inflated negative
binomial models may be appropriate (King 1989: 222f., Zorn 1998). Such models estimate two
separate equations – one to predict the presence of no incidents, and one to model the count,
where the count is positive. However, these models involve a difficult tradeoff: zero-inflated
negative binomial models are not able to take account of the heterogeneity in the dispersion
parameter that is addressed through a random effects negative binomial model. We confront this
challenge by estimating both types of models. The results are broadly comparable. Because the
random-effects model accounts for panel effects across opinions, we opt to present this model in
the main text. Results from the zero-inflated model are provided in the appendix.
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A. Results: Negative Treatments
We begin our analysis by investigating how often an opinion will be explicitly criticized,
questioned, or limited in a courts of appeals decision during a given year, i.e., the number of
times an opinion receives a treatment classified as strongly negative by Shepard’s. In Table 3, we
report results from a random effects negative binomial model (with bootstrapped standard
errors), predicting the count of strongly negative treatments of a given Supreme Court opinion
during a given year in courts of appeals decisions. Before focusing on the effects of the key
explanatory variables, note that the control variables are largely in line with the existing
literature. Once a case has been overruled, it attracts a larger number of strongly negative
treatments in the courts of appeals. Strongly negative treatments occur more rarely for opinions
signed by larger majorities, while opinions accompanied by concurrences attract a larger number
of strongly negative treatments. Opinions that are relevant for a greater number of cases, as
indicated by the fact that they are followed more often in the district courts, attract more strongly
negative treatments – a result that we interpret as evidence of the fact that opinions that come up
in many cases are at greater risk of being criticized simply because there are more opportunities
to do so. As opinions age, they attract fewer strongly negative treatments. Interestingly, we find
no statistically significant effect of the range of the coalition that supported the opinion, the
ideological shift between the enacting and current Supreme Court, or the enacting Supreme
Court and the overall ideological leaning of the courts of appeals.

Table 3 about here
Turning to our main variable of interest – the number of Justices in the original majority
coalition who remain on the Court – we find strong evidence consistent with our hypothesis. The
estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant, indicating that opinions receive
more strongly negative treatments as more Justices from the original majority retire. Importantly,
this effect is evident while controlling for general ideological change and the age of the opinion.
This provides strong support for our hypothesis.
Because estimated coefficients of count models are difficult to interpret directly, we
illustrate the substantive impact and the uncertainty surrounding our estimates graphically.
Figure 1 plots the predicted number of strongly negative treatments per year conditional on the
number of Justices who remain on the Court from the original majority coalition, along with 95%
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confidence intervals. The top panel shows this predicted number for unanimous opinions, the
second panel for 7-2 decisions, and the final panel for 5-4 decisions. The results are strikingly
consistent with the hypothesis. The predicted number of strongly negative treatments of a
Supreme Court opinion in the courts of appeals rises as the Justices who constituted the original
majority coalition retire. Moreover, the substantive size of the effect is significant: For
unanimous opinions, there is a roughly nine-fold increase in the expected number of strongly
negative treatments as the Justices who joined the decision retire until none are left on the Court.
For 7-2 decisions, the increase is roughly four-fold, while it is close to three-fold for 5-4
decisions. The absolute number of predicted strongly negative treatments is small. But, as we
noted above, strongly negative treatments represent a highly risky strategy for circuit court
judges, and that these are predicted counts of strongly negative treatments for a specific decision
in a specific year.

Figure 1 about here

B. Results: Positive Treatments (Followed)
Explicit negative treatments represent an extreme form of trying to limit the impact of a
relevant precedent and may, in this sense, be much like the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Rather
than engaging in overt resistance, circuit court judges who wish to avoid the implications of a
relevant precedent are more likely to engage in a less confrontational style of noncompliance:
They can simply refrain from following a precedent. And just as they may feel more comfortable
openly criticizing an opinion as the Justices who supported it retire from the Supreme Court, so
circuit court judges may feel less pressure to explicitly follow an opinion as the Justices who
supported the decision retire. We now turn to an analysis of this phenomenon.
In Table 4, we present the results of a random-effects, negative binomial model of the
number of explicit Followed treatments of a Supreme Court opinion in a given year with
bootstrapped standard errors. As in the previous analysis, the random effects estimation assumes
that the dispersion parameter is constant for any opinion, but can vary randomly across opinions.
Before turning to the key variable of interest, note that the control variables largely continue to
have the expected impact – in fact, the results are even stronger than for the negative treatments.
Most importantly, increasing ideological distance between the enacting Supreme Court and the
contemporary Supreme Court results in a smaller number of Followed treatments – that is, circuit
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judges are less likely to explicitly follow a precedent if the Court that enacted the precedent is
ideologically distant from the current Supreme Court. Similarly, as the courts of appeals as a
whole are ideologically more distant from the enacting Supreme Court, fewer Followed
treatments are predicted. Similarly, opinions that have been explicitly overruled by the Supreme
Court generate a smaller number of Follows. Interestingly, opinions supported by broader
coalitions – both in terms of the number of majority votes, as well as the ideological range of the
opinion coalition – result in fewer Followed treatments, a finding that stands in contrast to the
results for strongly negative treatments.
Of course, the main variable of interest is the number of Justices remaining of the original
majority coalition. Once again, the results clearly support our expectations. As the Justices who
originally joined a decision leave the Court, the number of Followed treatments begins to drop,
and this impact is statistically highly significant. As before, we turn to a graphic illustration to
demonstrate the substantive impact of this effect. In Figure 2, we plot the predicted number of
Followed treatments for an opinion in a given year, conditional on the number of Justices
remaining of the original majority (along with 95% confidence intervals). Once again, the top
panel illustrates the impact for unanimous decisions, the middle panel for 7-2 decisions, and the
bottom panel for 5-4 decisions.

Table 4 about here
Figure 2 about here
The message of Figure 2 is striking: As the Justices in the original majority coalition
retire, there is a statistically highly significant and substantively massive decrease in the
propensity of circuit courts to explicitly follow the opinion – the predicted number of Followed
treatments per year falls by roughly 70% (unanimous decisions) to 100% (5-4 decisions). Put
simply, as those Justices who explicitly supported a Supreme Court decision retire, circuit court
judges are significantly less likely to feel the need to explicitly follow the precedent in cases
before them.

V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court has a tremendous impact on social, economic, and political
outcomes in the US despite the fact that the Court itself revolves only a small number of disputes
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each term. Instead, much of the Court’s influence is indirect. The opinions issued by the Court
steer the decisions of lower courts – and it is in these lower courts that the vast bulk of legal
disputes are resolved. The prominent role of lower courts in giving life to the jurisprudential
doctrines announced by the Supreme Court raises a critical question: Given that lower court
judges must typically choose among a host of potentially relevant precedents, some of which
may conflict with one another, what makes a particular Supreme Court opinion more or less
influential in the lower courts? Scholars have long recognized the importance of this question,
and a well-established literature has explored factors that lead lower court judges to treat
opinions more or less favorably. We now know that the size and breadth of majority coalitions,
the number of concurrences, and the extent of ideological change on the Supreme Court all
contribute to how opinions are received in the lower courts (Benesh and Reddick 2002;
Benjamin and Desmarais 2012; Black and Spriggs 2008; Corley 2009, Westerland et al. 2010,
Hansford and Spriggs 2006).
In this paper, we have examined a factor that has so far escaped sustained examination:
The impact of the departure of Justices who supported a Supreme Court opinion. We have argued
that despite the Supreme Court’s insistence that lower courts should not engage in
prognostication in anticipating the views of the Supreme Court on relevant precedents, judges in
the lower courts face strong incentives to interpret the past decisions in ways that the current
Supreme Court will accept. Doing so minimizes the risk of suffering the embarrassment of being
reversed or reprimanded, and allows the lower court’s decision to go into effect. The retirement
of Supreme Court Justices is critical in this context, because the departure of Justices who signed
on to an opinion, and their replacement by new Justices can signal to lower court judges that
support for the opinion on the current Supreme Court may have weakened. Moreover, such
retirements are a particularly simple and easily observed heuristic. As a result, we expect that the
influence of Supreme Court opinions is subject to a retirement effect: Controlling for the degree
of ideological change on the Supreme Court, lower court judges are more likely to criticize
Supreme Court opinions and less likely to follow them as the Justices who joined the decision
retire. The smaller the number of Justices who remain from the original majority coalition, the
stronger this effect will become. Our empirical results, which are based on tracking the annual
treatment of all Supreme Court majority opinions in the courts of appeals between 1953 and
2012, provide clear and substantively significant support for this argument: As the Justices who
signed on to an opinion retire from the Court, the propensity of lower court judges to follow the
17

opinion drops significantly, and the willingness of lower court judges to explicitly criticize the
opinion increases.
These findings have important implications for our understanding of Supreme Court
precedents and the effects of personnel turnover on the Supreme Court. The Court sees itself as a
continuing body, and of course it is. But for purposes of its precedents, each new Court (that is,
after each departure and replacement) is a new entity, and lower court judges are likely to react to
the fact that Justices who joined a decision are no longer present. This implies that the
significance of the replacement of one Justice by another extends beyond the impact on future
decisions by the Supreme Court itself. Such a change also affects how existing case law is
applied in the judicial hierarchy. If a Justice wants a precedent to retain force in the lower courts,
she should remain on the Court, and encourage other members of the majority to remain as well.
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Table 1: Number of Strongly Negative and Positive Treatments of
Supreme Court Majority Opinions in the Courts of Appeals, 19532012
Strongly
Negative
Treatments

Positive
Treatments

None

4,795
(83%)

682
(12%)

1-3

894
(15%)

1,367
(23%)

4-7

71
(1%)

1,063
(17%)

8 or more

53
(1%)

2,701
(48%)

5,813

5,813

# of
Treatments

Number of
Opinions

Table 2: Number of Strongly Negative and Positive Treatments of
Supreme Court Majority Opinions in the Courts of Appeals on an
Annual Basis, 1953-2012
# of
Treatments
per year

Strongly
Negative
Treatments

Positive
Treatments

None

186,467
(99%)

145,240
(77%)

1

1,634
(0.9%)

23,321
(12.5%)

2-3

244
(0.1%)

12,233
(6.5%)

79
(0%)

7,630
(4%)

188,424

188,424

4 or more
Number of
OpinionYears
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Table 3: Strongly Negative Treatments of Supreme Court Majority
Opinions in the Courts of Appeals, 1953-2012
# of majority Justices remaining

-0.208 ***
(0.028)

Shift in SC medians

0.014
(0.079)

Shift between SC and CoA

-0.007
(0.005)

# of majority votes

-0.071 **
(0.029)

Range of majority

-0.003
(0.020)

# of concurrences

0.114 **
(0.045)

Strongly negative treatments by SC

-0.083
(0.089)

Case overruled

3.092 ***
(0.036)

# of contemporary follows in District
Courts (log)

0.307 ***
(0.036)

Opinion age

-0.065 ***
(0.006)

Constant

0.207
(0.230)

/ln(r)

1.949
(0.099)

/ln(s)

-1.082
(0.079)

N of opinion-years

188,424

N of opinions
BIC
AIC

5,813
20,620
20,488

NOTE: Dependent variable is # of strongly negative treatments in a Court of Appeals decision
in a given year. Random effects, negative binomial regression with bootstrapped standard
errors. *** significant at 0<0.01,** significant at p<0.05, * significant at p<0.10.
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Table 4: Positive Treatments of Supreme Court Majority Opinions
in the Courts of Appeals, 1953-2012
# of majority Justices remaining

0.070 ***
(0.008)

Shift in SC medians

-0.185 ***
(0.020)

Shift between SC and CoA

-0.005 ***
(0.001)

# of majority votes

-0.032 *
(0.018)

Range of majority

-0.035 **
(0.015)

# of concurrences

0.141 ***
(0.026)

Strongly negative treatments by SC

0.036
(0.040)

Case overruled

-0.543 ***
(0.089)

# of contemporary follows in District
Courts (log)

0.499 ***
(0.013)

Opinion age

-0.013 ***
(0.002)

Constant

0.459
(0.121)

/ln(r)

1.239
(0.044)

/ln(s)

-0.085
(0.027)

N of opinion-years

188,424

N of opinions
BIC
AIC

5,813
260,472
260,340

NOTE: Dependent variable is # of “follow” treatments in a Court of Appeals decision in a given
year. Random effects, negative binomial regression with bootstrapped standard errors. ***
significant at 0<0.01,** significant at p<0.05, * significant at p<0.10.
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Figure 1: Predicted number of strongly negative treatments/year
conditional on number of Justices remaining from the original
majority
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Figure 2: Predicted number of Followed treatments/year
conditional on number of Justices remaining from the original
majority
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Appendix – Robustness Checks
This appendix provides estimates from zero-inflated negative binomial models (with standard
errors clustered on Supreme Court opinion) as a robustness check on the random effects models
reported in the body of the paper. The zero-inflated models do not account for heterogeneity in
the dispersion parameter. However, they provide a separate logit model (the “inflation model”) to
predict whether an observation has no observations, followed by a count model that estimates a
negative binomial model for the positive counts. The inflation model is a logit model predicting
the probability of observing a zero count. Note the key result: The number of Justices has the
expected, statistically significant impact in the count model of both estimations. The more
Justices remain, the fewer the number of strong negative treatments, and the greater the number
of Followed treatments.
Table A1: Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Model of Strongly Negative Treatments
Inflation Model
# of majority Justices remaining

-0.093
(0.068)
0.193
(0.193)
0.039
(0.014)
0.245
(0.083)
0.012
(0.049)
-0.318
(0.100)
-1.356
(0.287)
-15.621
(7.663)

Shift in SC medians
Shift between SC and CoA
# of majority votes
Range of majority
# of concurrences
Strongly negative treatments by SC
Case overruled
# of contemporary follows in District Courts
(log)

***
***

***
***
**

-0.106
(0.110)

Opinion age

-0.048
(0.014)
0.421
(0.598)

Constant

Count model
-0.255
(0.066)
0.166
(0.177)
0.025
(0.014)
0.137
(0.071)
0.010
(0.043)
-0.192
(0.084)
0.322
(0.055)
2.102
(0.232)
0.364
(0.099)

***

alpha

3.102
(0.417)

N of opinion-years
N of non-zero observations
N of zero observations
BIC
AIC

188,424
1,957
186,467
21,783
21,550

-0.097
(0.010)
-2.210
(.0535)

***

*
*

**
***
***
***

***
***

NOTE: Dependent variable is # of strongly negative treatments in a court of appeals decision in
a given year. Zero-inflated negative binomial regression with standard errors clustered on the
opinion. *** significant at 0<0.01,** significant at p<0.05, * significant at p<0.10.
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Table A2: Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Model of Follow Treatments
Inflation Model
# of majority Justices remaining
Shift in SC medians
Shift between SC and CoA
# of majority votes
Range of majority
# of concurrences
Strongly negative treatments by SC
Case overruled
# of contemporary follows in District Courts
(log)
Opinion age
Constant

0.131
(0.035)
-0.130
(0.133)
-0.015
(0.008)
-0.016
(0.058)
-0.000
(0.031)
-0.232
(0.077)
0.636
(0.206)
-0.118
(0.347)
-2.758
(0.198)

***

0.048
(0.011)
-0.542
(0.255)

***

*

***
***

***

**

alpha

0.402
(0.097)

N of opinion-years
N of non-zero observations
N of zero observations
BIC
AIC

188,424
43,184
145,240
294,082
293,849

Count model
0.086
(0.025)
-0.241
(0.068)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.060
(0.035)
-0.014
(0.018)
0.058
(0.036)
1.014
(0.453)
-0.397
(0.223)
0.847
(0.036)

***

-0.016
(0.007)
-0.348
(.164)

**

***

*

**
*
***

**

NOTE: Dependent variable is # of Follow treatments in a court of appeals decision in a given
year. Zero-inflated negative binomial regression with standard errors clustered on the opinion.
*** significant at 0<0.01,** significant at p<0.05, * significant at p<0.10.
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